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The explosion and subsequent death of four people
at the T2 Laboratories, chemical facility in Jackson-
ville, Florida, USA, in 2007 has resulted in the United
States Chemical Safety Board finding that undergrad-
uate chemical engineering students do not receive
adequate knowledge in the hazards associated with
chemical processing. This article summarizes the
events that led up to the T2 tragedy. A reactor engi-
neering analysis of the event is presented that can be
used in a chemical reaction engineering classroom to
demonstrate the hazards involved when dealing
with exothermic reactions and methods to mitigate.
 2010 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Pro-
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INTRODUCTION
Description of the Accident
On December 19, 2007 at 1:33 PM, a tremendous
explosion shocked the northern Jacksonville, Florida
region. Tons of sodium, hydrogen, and organics
exploded into surrounding environment via a reactor
rupture and caught fire [1]. The explosion occurred at
a chemical producer called T2 Laboratories. Four
people lost their life. Thirty-two people within the vi-
cinity suffered injuries. The power of the shock wave
was felt 15 miles away. A video about the event is
available to the public via the CSB website [2]. Figure
1 shows the resultant plant damage a day after the
event. The plant manufactured methylcyclopenta-
dienyl manganese tricarbonyl, a gasoline antiknock
additive, for a third party distributor. At the time, a
2,450 gallon batch reactor was producing the first in-
termediate, sodium methylcyclopentadiene and
hydrogen (a by-product) from the reaction of metallic
sodium with methylcyclopentadiene. Diethylene gly-
col dimethyl ether (diglyme) was used as a solvent.
This was the 175th batch manufactured by the
facility.
The Major Deviation that Fateful Day
The underlying direct cause of the accident was
the loss of cooling water to a reactor processing an
exothermic reaction. A jacketed reactor, with the abil-
ity to transfer heat generated by reaction, was used.
Figure 2 shows a cross-section of the reactor. Water
was added to a cooling jacket that surrounded the re-
actor. Vaporization of the water inside the jacket car-
ried away the heat released by the main reaction.
Around 1:23 PM, a reactor operator contacted the
one of the plant owners (a chemical engineer)
informing him that there was no cooling water flow
to the reactor.
What was normally a multihour exothermic pro-
cess done at 3508F (176.78C) became a 10-min exo-
This was provided to us anonymously by a reviewer of the first draft of
this work.
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thermic process. The reaction rate accelerated as
described by the Arrhenius effect. More complicated,
and unknown to the plant employees, was a critical
temperature, 3908F (198.68C), where a second, stron-
ger, exothermic reaction kicked in, the decomposition
reaction of diglyme either catalyzed or enhanced by
the presence of sodium. This rapid decomposition
led to the creation of gases and vapors at a very rapid
rate. Quickly, the rate of gas generation exceeded the
4"-diameter relief system’s ability to relieve the reac-
tor without further build up of pressure and eventual
explosion. Within minutes of the recognition of the
hazardous situation, the reactor exploded.
CSB Major Recommendations Include
Changes in Safety Education of
Chemical Engineers
A major finding from the CSB investigation was
that fundamental faults lie within the educational
preparations of chemical engineering students. The
owners and engineers involved with T2 had little
background in dealing with reactive chemicals tracing
all the back to their chemical engineering undergrad-
uate educational preparation. The CSB recommenda-
tions were [3]:
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
2008-03-I-FL-1: Work with the Accreditation Board
for Engineering and Technology to add reactive haz-
ard awareness to baccalaureate chemical engineering
curricula requirements.
2008-03-I-FL-2: Inform all student members about
the (AIChE) Process Safety Certificate Program and
encourage program participation.
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
2008-03-I-FL-3: Work with the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers to add reactive hazard awareness
to baccalaureate chemical engineering curricula
requirements.
Present Resources Available for
Safety Education
A major resource group for safety education sour-
ces is through the Center for Chemical Process Safety
of the AIChE and its subcommittee called Safety and
Chemical Engineering Education. This group of
industrialists, academics, and government representa-
tives has been offering materials for chemical engi-
neering education for more than 20 years. Their web-
site is http://www.sache.org. Publications describ-
ing the group’s efforts are available in Refs. 4–11, and
12.
Reactor Analysis/Modeling
The analyses of exothermic reactions are not
trivial. If heat transfer is involved, independent var-
iables on conversion included all reactor starting
concentrations, reactor temperature, coolant tem-
perature, and time. All have nonlinear effects on
conversion. For example, increasing temperature
can accelerate a reaction rate when temperature
control is lost. The heat released by the reaction is
absorbed by the contents within the reactor. The
contents heat up. The reaction goes faster. The con-
tents heat up more. The reaction goes even faster.
This response is commonly known as a runaway
reaction. Under severe circumstances, reactor fail-
ure can occur due to high pressure as a result of
gaseous product generation and the presence of
high temperatures. Each species within the reactor
volume has a differential equation based on the
mass (mole) balance. The energy balance around
the reactor creates another differential equation.
When the vapor phase is included, at least one
more differential equation evolves. Finally, there is
the challenge of determining properties, especially
when the mixture is nonideal. Sophisticated pro-
grams are available that can combine properties
prediction and exothermic reaction analysis to-
gether such as SuperChems by IoMosaic [13]. An
example of the use of SuperChems in the modeling
Figure 1. Overview of the accident scene shortly after the event. (CSB report, p. 3 Ref. 1).
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of a complex exothermic reaction is presented in a
paper by Willey et al. [14]. However, this program
is not easily accessible to chemical engineering
students and requires substantial instruction to
understand. In this work, we explore an intermedi-




The CSB report offers details of the chemistry
about the reactions used at T2 in the report’s Appen-
dix A [1]. The exothermic reaction occurring at the
time of the accident was related to the first step: the
Figure 2. Cross sectional view of the reactor. Note that the jacketed cooling zone (light grey) which used evapo-
ration of water to remove the heat generated by the reaction. (CSB report, p. 20, Ref. 1).
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combination of sodium and methylcyclopentadiene
to sodium methylcyclopentadiene and a 0.5 mole of
hydrogen. Further, the report noted that a second,
previous unknown, exothermic reaction followed the
decomposition of the solvent, diglyme, in the pres-
ence of sodium. Decompositions are very compli-
cated. They do not go completely to the lowest
energy products such as water or carbon dioxide. Of-
ten, a complex residue is left behind composed of
carbon and hydrogen, and is essentially, best referred
to as tar. The CSB report did not present the detailed
chemical analysis of the products produced when
diglyme decomposes, however, diglyme contains 3
atoms of oxygen, 6 atoms of carbon, and 14 atoms of
hydrogen. We used this to imagine that when the
diglyme decomposed, three moles of permanent gas
(either CO or H2) formed. It is this formation of a
permanent gas, into confined space along with the
increasing vapor pressure due to higher temperatures
that created the rapid rise in pressure, and subse-
quent vessel failure.
The CSB report provided figures of reaction calo-
rimetry studies completed for pure diglyme in the
presence of sodium, and for a reactant mixture repre-
sentative of normal operation. A VSP2 calorimeter
was used in which background can be read in a PSP
article by Theis et al. [15]. The VSP2 results demon-
strated conclusively that the diglyme in the presence
of sodium rapidly decomposes when the temperature
exceeded 3908F. The pressure and temperature rise
during this exothermic reaction at it peak conditions
was about 32,000 psig per minute and 2,3408F per
minute, respectively [1]. We modeled the second reac-
tion as a first-order decomposition with an activation
energy of 80 kJ mol21. Essentially, the first trace of
exothermic activity is shown around 3588F and the
start of the runaway is noted at 3908F. For the reac-
tion of sodium with methylcyclopentadiene, we esti-
mated an activation energy of 40 kJ mol21, again
using VSP2 data for guidance.
Several other parameters had to be estimated to
reach a working model for the two reactions
involved. These were the composition loaded into
the reactor (we used the same mass fractions as given
in Table 1). For the amount loaded into the reactor,
we selected a level of two-thirds full based on the
video presented by the CSB on the accident that
shows this level in the reactor [2]. This equates to
6,000 dm3 (or liters) of liquid and 3,000 dm3 of ‘‘head
space’’ or gas space within the reactor. The heat of
reactions were initially estimated via Aspen simula-
tion software [16], and later slightly adjusted to match
the temperature rise shown in the CSB report [1].
These values were 245 kJ per mol of sodium reacted
to products and 2390 kJ per mol of diglyme decom-
posed, respectively. We also needed heat capacity of
the liquid reaction mixture plus the reactor shell that
was estimated to be a sum of 16 MJ K21 for the entire
mass of the reactor mixture and reactor mass (Smicpi
of liquid contents and reactor material). As we
worked on the model, we included an energy term
for the vaporization of diglyme. Vaporization tempers
the heating effect within the reactor because a por-
tion of the heat released by reaction is used to vapor-
ize the solvents within the reaction. For example, if
the reactor’s rupture disk had open at 75 psig, then
the rapid vaporization of the reactor contents would
have cooled the reactor and prevented the reactor




Reaction 1 (normal process reaction).
C6H8 þ Na ! ½C6H7   Naþ þ 0:5H2 þ heat
Kinetic rate model used: 2rC6H8 5 k1[CNa][C6H8],




3 mol21 min21 and E1 5 40,000 J
mol21 K21
Reaction 2 (diglyme decomposition reaction).
C6H14O3 ! 3 moles of gasþ a liquid or solid residual
þ heat
Kinetic rate model used 2rC6H14O3 5 k2[C6H14O3],
mols dm23 min21. With k25 k2S exp(2E2/RT) min
21
k2S 5 1 3 10
6 min21 and E2 5 80,000 J mol
21 K
Reactor Type
The reactor type used was a batch reactor with the
ability to bleed off pressure via a 1@ line. Should the
pressure exceed the rupture disk rating, the rupture
disk would burst and vent the reactor. The venting











Sodium 5.147 10.59 593 4.3
MCDP dimer 21.164 43.55 2,452 2.55
Diglyme 20.690 42.58 2,415 3
Mineral oil 1.591 3.28 185 0.088
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equation was only focused on the 4@ line. The venting
was modeled proportional to the absolute pressure in
the reactor assuming critical flow of vapor through line.
Process Simulation by Polymath
Polymath is a software program developed by Mi-
chael B. Cutlip et al. [17] for general use in chemical
engineering and includes differential equations solv-
ing. It is geared to the chemical engineering student,
and its programming is straightforward. Fogler inte-
grates Polymath examples throughout his reaction
chemical engineering textbook [18]. Many examples
are presented to assist students and others in the use
of this important mathematical tool. Educational and
professional versions of Polymath are available at
moderate prices [19]. Inexpensive site licenses of the
educational student version are available via the
CACHE web site [20].
RESULTS
The Polymath code used in the simulation is avail-
able from the authors. Verification of the model run-
ning adiabatically is compared against the CSB’s
reported VSP2 data, which is shown in Figure 3.
Three scenarios were then simulated: (1) normal
operation, with a cooling water added to maintain
the reactor temperature at 3508F; (2) operation with-
out cooling water (an adiabatic reactor) with a rup-
ture disk opening set at 75 psig; and (3) an adiabatic
reactor with a rupture disk opening set at 400 psig.
Temperature and pressure profiles are shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5 for the three scenarios. It is clear that
the reactor never exceeds 3908F if cooling water is
present. If the rupture disk opens at 75 psig, the reac-
tor continues to heat and pressurize but at a slow
rate, and eventually cooling occurs due to internal
vaporization. On the other hand, venting the reactor
at 400 psig leads to a runaway, as the reaction pres-
sure generation rate far exceeds the cooling offered
by the vaporization. The results happen very rapidly,
within a few minutes once the temperature passes
5008F. Figure 6 shows the conversion profiles of so-
dium, which represents the normal desired reaction
for the three scenarios. Figure 7 shows the conver-
sion of diglyme for the three scenarios. When run-
Figure 3. Matching of reaction model with VSP2 data
offered for mixture as shown in the CSB T2 report,
Figure 18.
Figure 4. Temperature as a function of time for the
three scenarios investigated in this work.
Figure 5. Pressure as a function of time for the three
scenarios. Note the rapid pressure rise for the relief
opening occurring at 400 psig.
Figure 6. Conversion of sodium the limiting reactant
within the reactor.
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away occurs, it is the rapid conversion of diglyme
that causes the explosion.
DISCUSSION
This case study is an excellent example of run-
away batch reactions, and can be explained to the
students of chemical engineering at several levels. At
the undergraduate level, one can point out that every
exothermic batch reaction deserves respect and
understanding. That test mixtures should be run at
the small scale in thermochemistry instruments such
as Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC), Vent Sizing
Package (VSP), and Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC).
That the test runs should include all reactants, solvents,
and products to insure that the thermochemistry is
understood at the microscale first. This point can be
mentioned even in organic chemistry classes discussing
exothermic organic reactions. At the next level, under-
graduate reactor engineering, the hazards associated with
scale up and processing reactions in batch reactors can
be pointed out using this example. The CSB online
video adds to the classroom presentation. At the gradu-
ate level, students can review the details of the model
presented in this article, look at the assumptions, and
improve on the predictability, in an effort to understand
what details are needed to predict runaway reactions.
For the practitioner, we offer techniques to simplify a
complicated system, methods to estimate activation
energy and system properties, plus the use of an easy to
use differential equation solver that makes examining the
system facile.
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Figure 7. Conversion of diglyme for the three scenar-
ios. Runaway occurs for rupture disk setting of 400
psi.
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